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Abstract
This paper establishes the existence of a previously overlooked relationship between
agglomeration and hours worked. Among non-professionals, hours worked decrease with the
density of workers in the same occupation. Among professionals, a positive relationship is
found. This relationship is twice as strong for the young as for the middle-aged. Moreover,
young professional hours worked are shown to be especially sensitive to the presence of rivals.
We show that these patterns are consistent with the selection of hard workers into cities and the
high productivity of agglomerated labor. The behavior of young professionals is also consistent
with the presence of keen rivalry in larger markets, a kind of urban rat race. This evidence of a
rat race is nearly unique in the literature.

I.

Introduction

“ [In New York] [e]very man seems to feel that he has got the duties of two lifetimes to
accomplish in one, and so he rushes, rushes, rushes, and never has time to be companionable never has any time at his disposal to fool away on matters which do not involve dollars and duty
and business.” Mark Twain, Letter to Alta California, 11 August 1867.
“The twelve labors of Hercules were trifling in comparison with those which my neighbors have
undertaken; for they were only twelve, and had an end; but I could never see that these men slew
or captured any monster or finished any labor” Henry David Thoreau, Walden, Chapter 1:
Economy (1854).
It is not a new idea that cities are busy places, as the quotes from Twain and Thoreau
show. It is also not an idea without current relevance. If anything, modern life is more hurried
than was life in the Nineteenth Century. For instance, a recent ABC News Poll found that 26%
of Americans believed they worked too hard.1 Despite this, the connection between spatial
concentration and the intensity of work has for the most part escaped attention in both labor and
urban economics. In the literature on labor supply (see Pencavel (1986) for a survey), there has
been almost no attention paid to agglomeration.2 In the literature on agglomeration economies,
the focus has been on labor productivity and growth rather than on hours worked.3
This paper considers the relationship between agglomeration and hours worked. It makes
three contributions. First, it shows that there is a consistent relationship between agglomeration
and the intensity of work. Second, it establishes that the impact of agglomeration varies across
the labor market, with important differences between young and middle-aged workers and

1

The same poll finds overwork to be a cause of mistakes at work and of health problems. In a similar vein, Schor
(1991) uses CPS data on reported work hours to conclude that leisure has declined since the late 1960s. In contrast,
Robinson and Bostrom (1994) use time diaries, concluding that leisure has increased.

2
3

The only exceptions have been the inclusion of metropolitan area population or urban dummies.

See Rosenthal and Strange (2003b) for an empirical survey or Fujita and Thisse (2001) for theory. Glaeser et al
(1992), Henderson et al (1995), and Ciccone and Hall (1996) are important empirical contributions.

between professionals and non-professionals. The paper's third contribution is to test for various
explanations of the agglomeration-hours worked pattern that appears in the data.
We begin with an illustration. Using data from the 5% Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS), Table 1 reports average hours worked by full-time male employees for the three
largest cities and three much smaller nearby cities located beyond typical commuting distance
(respectively, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and Hartford, Milwaukee, Sacramento).4 The
data are partitioned into young men in their 30’s and middle aged men in their 40’s, and also into
professionals and non-professionals.5 The table documents a clear relationship between hours
worked and agglomeration. For non-professionals, average hours worked are similar for the two
groups of cities and for each age class. In contrast, professionals work roughly 1 hour longer in
the larger cities. Moreover the difference in hours worked is greater among the young than the
middle-aged. This pattern also is apparent among male lawyers and judges, a profession famous
for its long hours worked (Landers et al (1996)). Young lawyers, for example, worked roughly 2
hours longer in the bigger cities on average, 50.05 versus 47.71. In contrast, among middle-aged
male lawyers there is little difference in average hours worked. Taken as a whole, Table 1
suggests that there is a positive relationship between agglomeration and hours worked for
professionals, but not for non-professionals. This evidence of work behavior differing between
professionals and non-professionals echoes Colemen and Pencavel (1993a and b), who report

4

Full-time is defined as those working at least 35 hours per week. Summary measures based on a cut-off of 40 hours
per week are similar, with the average hours worked slightly higher for each category as would be expected. We
also conducted all of the analysis in this paper separately for female workers. Results were similar although
somewhat weaker, and are not reported to conserve space.
5

Professionals are defined as individuals in Census occupations in the Professional-Technical group who also have a
Masters degree or higher. Non-professionals are defined as individuals in all other occupations except managers and
agricultural workers who also have less than a college degree. Person sampling weights available in the IPUMs
(perwt) were used to ensure that the estimates in Table 1 are representative.
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that hours worked has increased over time among educated workers in the U.S., while hours
worked have fallen among less educated workers.
What forces might be responsible for this pattern? One is that big city workers may
choose longer hours because their work is more productive and therefore better rewarded.
Another is that hard workers may be drawn to large cities. A third explanation is that there is
more rivalry in large markets, leading workers to choose long hours as a way to signal ability.
We characterize this as an “urban rat race”. Finally, it is also possible that adding workers to a
local labor market could reduce individual hours worked as the total workload is spread over a
larger number of individuals. These forces yield different predictions about the agglomerationhours worked relationship.
We test for the presence of these forces using full-time workers from the 1990 5%
IPUMS of the Decennial Census. Among non-professionals, increased spatial concentration of
workers in the individual’s occupation is associated with fewer hours worked, consistent with
work spreading. The opposite is true for professional workers of all ages. Among these
workers, hours increase with the density of employment in the worker’s occupation and location,
consistent with the presence of selection and productivity effects. Moreover, the latter effect is
twice as large for young professionals as for middle-aged professionals.
To investigate these patterns further, we augment the professional models with controls
for local labor market rivals and the financial rewards to advancement. When the rewards to
getting ahead are zero, the presence of rivals has a negative effect on hours worked for both
young and middle-aged professionals. This effect is of nearly the same magnitude for both
groups. This implies that when the rewards to getting ahead are limited, young professionals
behave in a manner similar to middle-aged professionals. However, as the rewards to getting
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ahead increase, the presence of rivals has a positive influence on hours worked that is sharply
higher for young professionals as compared to middle-aged professionals. Our estimates imply
that in large cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, the presence of rivals increases
young professional work hours by the equivalent of a standard work week over the course of a
year – a large effect. These findings are consistent with the rivalry explanation of the urban rat
race.
The paper's results are quite robust, holding for an extensive set of occupation-MSA
fixed effects. In addition, results of a wage model reinforce our interpretation of the hours
model. The key finding is that wage rates increase with the density of employment in the
worker’s occupation, regardless of age and professional status. However, this effect is
substantially larger for middle-aged professionals and smallest for non-professionals, suggesting
that agglomeration enhances productivity most for the skilled. In addition, the extra hours
worked generated by rivalrous behavior among young professionals is shown to reduce wage
rates among this group. That pattern is consistent with diminishing productivity and worker
fatigue, which would be anticipated when workers divert their efforts from production to
signaling activities.
Although the paper’s primary purpose is to advance the understanding of urban labor
markets by documenting the relationship between labor supply and agglomeration, the paper also
advances the understanding of rat race effects. Akerlof's (1976) paper is fundamental in the vast
literature on adverse selection in labor markets. Despite this, there has been little empirical work
on the rat race. The best test to date is Landers et al (1996), who survey lawyers in two large
firms in large Northeastern cities. They identify a rat race in several ways. First, they show that
lawyers work long hours, especially young ones, and that these lawyers would like to reduce
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hours even if this were to mean lower income. Second, they show that both associates and
partners perceive hours worked as being crucial in determining which associates will be accepted
as partners. As with Landers et al, we consider the different situations faced by younger and
older workers. In contrast to Landers et al, we look across all occupations and cities rather than
analyzing a single occupation in a single firm or city. In addition, we examine actual hours
worked rather than relying on survey evidence on worker satisfaction and attitudes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses our data and
variable construction and documents the relationship between agglomeration and hours worked.
Section III looks at several explanations of the observed relationship, including productivity,
selection, and rivalry. Section IV concludes.

II.

Agglomeration and labor supply: stylized facts

A.

Data and variables
This section documents the relationship between agglomeration and labor supply using

the IPUMs data described above.6 As before, we include only full-time workers in the analysis,
defined as those who reported that their usual hours worked were 35 or more per week. We also
experiment with a sample based on individuals working 40 hours per week or more. Results for
this latter group are nearly identical to those from the 35 hours-plus sample and are not reported.7
As in Table 1, we divide workers into two occupational groups. Professional workers are
defined to be individuals in Census occupations categorized as “Professional” or “Technical”

6

See www.ipums.org.

7

We also ran the models setting the minimum hours worked to 1 hour or more per week. For men results were little
changed. For women results differed owing to the substantial number of part-time workers.

5

who also have a Masters or more for educational attainment.8 Non-Professional workers are
defined to be those who have less than a Bachelors degree and belong to all other occupational
categories except farmers and managers.9 Individuals not belonging to one of these two groups
are excluded from the sample. This ensures that our division of workers into Professional and
Non-Professional categories is as meaningful as possible.10 In addition, in all of the estimated
models, each of these groups is further subdivided into young and middle-aged men and women,
where young workers are between age 30 through 39, and middle-aged workers are between age
40 through 49.
Our primary goal is to identify the various dimensions of the agglomeration-hours
worked relationship. To do this we must control for the influence of individual-specific
attributes. In part this is because unobserved wage rates affect an individual’s willingness to
supply labor, but wage rates themselves are sensitive to an individual’s skills and attributes.
Accordingly, in all of the empirical models to follow we control for the worker’s level of
education, the presence of children, marital status, age, race, years of residency in the United
States, and commute times. In addition, we also control for occupation fixed effects in order to
capture unobserved productivity differences across occupations. Such differences further affect
wage rates and hours worked.11

8

This includes individuals with a Masters, Professional of Ph.D. degree.

9

The occupational categories were defined based on the OCC1950 variable in the IPUMs data file. In addition,
occupations excluded from both Professional-Technical workers and Non-Professionals include Farmers and farm
managers (occ1950>=100 & occ1950<=123), Managers, Officials, and Proprietors (occ1950>=200 &
occ1950<=290), Non-occupational responses (cc1950>=980 & occ1950<=997), NA-blank (occ1950==999) and any
observations with missing values for OCC1950.
10

For example, many individuals indicate that they work in professional or technical occupations but have less than a
Masters degree, and in some cases, less than a college degree. Regressions based on these individuals suggested that
their behavior becomes similar to that of the Non-Professionals defined above as the level of education falls.

11

Wage rates are not included directly in the model because of concerns about endogeneity. This issue arises in
nearly all hours worked studies, but is especially tricky when using the PUMS data where wage is not directly
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For all of the labor supply models, we use the log of hours worked per week as the
dependent variable. Specifically, we use the usual hours worked per week in the last year.12 It is
widely understood that male and female labor market participation differs, so we estimate
separately for the two genders. Only the male results are presented here. The female results are
similar, if slightly weaker. Finally, for all of the models to follow, t-ratios are calculated based
on robust standard errors that are further clustered based on the Work PUMAs. This tends to
work in the direction of lowering the reported t-ratios but allows for a more general pattern of
residuals.

B.

Urbanization and hours worked
We begin by regressing log hours on occupation fixed effects, worker attributes, and a

measure of urbanization, the log population density of the Work PUMA (PopDen). Work
PUMAs have an average of roughly 210,000 people in residence and range from just over
100,000 people present to over 3 million.13 The popular notion that urban life is busy and
preliminary summary measures in Table 1 both suggest that individuals work longer hours in
larger cities, leading one to expect a positive coefficient on PopDen. However, if there is a
limited amount of work to be done, then having more workers of a particular type might tend to
result in each working shorter hours, ceteris paribus. If this kind of work-spreading occurs, this
reported. Instead, hourly wage rates are calculated by dividing annual wage earnings by the number of weeks
worked in the previous year and the usual number of hours worked per week. See Kahn and Lang (1991) for a
discussion of this reduced-form approach.
12

In the IPUMS this is measured using UHRSWORK.

13

Work PUMAs correspond to regions identified by the first three digits of the 5-digit residential PUMA code.
Large metropolitan areas have numerous work PUMAs, but in rural areas a single work PUMA can cover a large
geographic area. Information on the population and geographic area of each residential PUMA was obtained from
the Census Mable geographic engine available on the web (See http://www.census.gov/plue/ ). Residential PUMAs
were then matched to their corresponding work PUMAs, enabling us to calculate the work PUMA population and
land area. Dividing yields the population density of the work PUMA (PopDen).

7

would imply the opposite sign on PopDen. The possibility that workers might concentrate in this
way in equilibrium is consistent with various models, including Harris-Todaro (1970) on urban
unemployment and MacDonald (1988) on rising stars.14
Results are presented in Table 2. We consider young professionals first. For young
workers, hours worked are 4.3 percent higher for individuals with a Ph.D. or professional degree
in comparison to the omitted category of workers with a Masters degree. Among middle-aged
professionals the influence of a higher degree is nearly identical, 4.6 percent. Both estimates are
highly significant. For both age groups, the presence of children does not have a significant
effect on hours worked. Married individuals work 1.2 percent and 2.0 percent longer among
young and middle-aged workers, respectively. Age has no effect for either group. African
Americans work 2.7 percent and 2.8 percent less than the omitted white group for young and
middle-aged workers, respectively. Similar effects are present for Asian and Hispanic workers
and once more, estimates are similar across age groups. Immigrant status has varying effects
that differ in some instances across age groups. The influence of log commute times is negative
and similar for both age groups. Finally, for non-professionals, the variables above have similar
qualitative effects on hours worked. The principal exception is the presence of children, which
has a strong positive effect on non-professional hours.
Several patterns are notable in these results. First, the coefficients agree with priors about
the influence of household attributes on labor supply. Second, for non-professional workers,
estimates are similar for young and middle-aged workers, a pattern that will extend to the
agglomeration variables to follow. Third, coefficient estimates for young professionals also are

14

Harris and Todaro (1970) show that when the urban wage is fixed above the market clearing level, there can be
unemployment in equilibrium. In Macdonald (1988), the possibility of a rewarding career as a "star" leads a large
number of young workers to participate in the contest determining who gets to be a star.

8

similar to those for middle-aged professionals. However, this pattern will not extend to the role
of agglomeration.
We now consider the influence of log-population density on hours worked. Among nonprofessionals, the elasticity of hours worked with respect to population density of the
individual’s Work PUMA is negative and similar in magnitude for both age groups. This is
consistent with work-spreading. In contrast, the elasticity among professional workers is
positive and significant for younger workers but twenty times smaller, close to zero, and
insignificant for older workers. Thus, urbanization has a positive effect on the labor supply of
young professionals, but has either an insignificant or a negative effect on other workers.

C.

Localization and hours worked
Do the estimates from Table 2 imply that population density per se is associated with

longer hours worked by young professional workers? Not necessarily. Perhaps instead a worker
is motivated more by the presence of workers in the same occupation. After all, lawyers do not
compete with doctors in the labor market. To consider this possibility, we add a control for the
occupation-specific employment density of a work PUMA (OccDen). This was done by adding
up the number of full-time workers (35 or more hours per week, as noted above) between the
ages of 30 to 65 in each occupation for each work PUMA – weighted by the person weights in
the IPUMS to ensure a representative sample – and then dividing by the geographic area of the
work PUMA. This variable was calculated separately for each of the occupations in the
Professional-Technical group and each of the occupations in the Non-Professional group, a total
of just over two hundred occupations. Following Hoover (1948), we refer to this as a measure of
localization.

9

Table 3 reports results with the localization variable OccDen included in the model. To
simplify presentation, only the coefficients on the agglomeration variables are reported. In
addition, the PopDen coefficients from the models in Table 2 are also presented to facilitate
comparison.
Beginning once more with the non-professionals (the last four columns of Table 3), for
both age groups, adding the localization variable causes the population density coefficient to
change from negative and highly significant, to positive, close to zero, and clearly insignificant.
In contrast, the elasticity of hours worked with respect to OccDen is - 0.16 percent and
significant for both age groups. Once more this is consistent with the presence of workspreading, but in this case the effect arises from proximity to workers in the same occupation and
not from city size per se.
Among professional workers, localization effects also appear to dominate. For young
workers the elasticity of hours worked with respect to OccDen is .43 percent and highly
significant. Among middle-aged workers the elasticity with respect to OccDen is smaller, just
.23 percent with a t-ratio of 2.35. In contrast, PopDen now has a negative impact on hours
worked for both age groups, though significant only for the younger workers.
In sum, this section has presented evidence that labor supply varies systematically with
agglomeration. The strongest pattern is for young professionals. They work longer hours when
there is a high density of other workers in the same occupation. The elasticity is roughly twice
as a large for young professionals as for middle-aged professionals. Non-professionals, in
contrast, work fewer hours when there are many similar workers nearby.

10

III.

Agglomeration and labor supply: explanations

A.

Productivity, selection, and the urban rat race
There are many factors that might lead to some sort of positive relationship between

agglomeration and labor supply among professional workers. This section will consider three:
productivity, selection, and rivalry among workers that produces a sort of rat race. The
productivity channel is easy to understand. There is compelling evidence that agglomeration
increases productivity (see the literature review in Rosenthal and Strange (2003b)). If workers
are paid for extra hours, either through an explicit wage or some sort of implicit contract, then
agglomeration and related productivity gains will encourage workers to choose longer hours.
Several kinds of selection can lead to a positive relationship between agglomeration and
labor supply. As above, if workers are more productive when agglomerated, then those with a
taste for long hours will be well-rewarded for choosing cities. This leads naturally to a positive
relationship. This is related to Leamer (1999), who argues that employers seek to match
expensive capital with workers who will take best advantage of it. Agglomeration is like an
expensive piece of capital: urbanization enhances productivity but urban land rents are high.
Urban entrepreneurs, therefore, will seek out industrious workers, while industrious workers will
be lured to urban areas by the promise of higher wages. Selection can also occur if hard working
professionals have a taste for theater, fine restaurants, and other consumption amenities that are
more readily found in large cities. Both the wage- and consumption-selection mechanisms have
the potential to draw industrious workers to cities, contributing to a positive relationship between
agglomeration and hours worked.
The effect of rivalry on labor supply in cities is more complicated. Here we appeal to
Akerlof's (1976) classic signaling model. He supposes that workers are heterogeneous in type,

11

with higher-type workers being both more productive and more willing to work long hours. The
latter is obviously related to the Spence (1973) condition. Under some circumstances, a rat race
equilibrium exists, with all workers except those of the lowest type working harder than they
would like in order to avoid being mistaken for lower-type workers and paid accordingly. This
result depends crucially on local labor markets being relatively “thick”. Unless there is a lowtype worker who is fairly close in ability, a high-type worker need not buy into the rat race and
work long hours in order to signal. Urban markets are thick, of course. This means that a
worker in a large city may choose to work harder in order to be distinguished from rivals,
especially if the rewards to advancement are high.
This rat race discussion is quite particular. The idea that rivalry is keener in larger
markets is much more general. For instance, in a patent race, a larger number of competitors
results in a larger equilibrium level of research and development (Lee and Wilde (1980)). Also,
in independent values first-price auctions, a larger number of rivals leads each individual to bid
an amount closer to his or her actual valuation (McAfee and McMillan (1988)). Thus, there are
many situations where a larger market leads to more vigorous competition.

B.

Predictions of the explanations
Productivity, selection, and rivalry can all explain some sort of positive relationship

between agglomeration and hours worked. However, the three forces have very different
implications for the form that the relationship will take. One difference concerns the sorts of
occupations that are likely to exhibit a positive relationship between market size and work hours.
In the presence of productivity effects, workers put in long hours because they are compensated
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for doing so. Because of selection-wage effects, industrious workers are drawn to agglomerated
areas anticipating this compensation. These patterns should apply to workers in all occupations.
On the other hand, in the rivalry explanation, workers put in long hours in order to signal
their ability. These effects are likely to be stronger in occupations where productivity cannot be
easily monitored, and where reputation building is important. Such conditions are often
characteristic of professional occupations, where output is somewhat intangible. This is in
contrast to non-professional occupations, where output is more readily identified. In addition,
professionals typically work for a salary, while most non-professionals work for an hourly wage.
This weakens the link between output and compensation for professionals relative to nonprofessionals. Taken together, these differences suggest that rivalry effects will lead to a
stronger agglomeration-market size relationship for professional occupations than in nonprofessionals occupations.
Another difference between the productivity, selection, and rivalry explanations concerns
work hours over an individual’s lifetime. Returning to the rivalry explanation, it is likely that
after a worker has been active in the labor market for many years, then firms will no longer be
uncertain about the worker's type. This would be consistent with models of job ladders (i.e.,
MacLeod and Malcomson (1988)). In this situation, later in their careers, workers would no
longer need to work longer hours to distinguish themselves from their less-able coworkers. This
implies that the effect of agglomeration on work hours should be lower for older workers.
The life-cycle predictions of the rivalry explanation are not shared by the productivity or
selection-wage explanations. As long as productivity is higher for all workers – there is no
evidence otherwise in the agglomeration literature – then workers would continue to take
advantage of high urban productivity and work long hours. Similarly, industrious workers will
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be drawn to agglomerated areas in order to take advantage of higher wages. It seems likely that
these effects would not erode over a worker's life. Consequently, in both the productivity and
selection-wage explanations, the effect of agglomeration on work hours is likely to persist. This
implies that localization effects should be relatively similar for young and middle-aged workers.
One final difference depends the nature of agglomeration itself, specifically city size
versus the spatial concentration of a given occupation. Urban consumer amenities (e.g. theater)
are likely associated more with the size and density of the entire city rather than with the density
of a given occupation. For that reason, selection-consumption effects are likely captured by the
PopDen variable in Model 2 of Table 2 and are unlikely to account for the positive relationship
between localization (OccDen) and hours worked among professionals.
Thus far, our discussion of the explanations linking hours worked and agglomeration has
emphasized labor supply. As suggested earlier, labor demand may also play a role. If there is a
limited amount of work to be done, having more workers of a particular type will tend to result
in each working shorter hours, ceteris paribus. This has the potential to affect the hours worked
of both young and middle-aged workers. In addition, the effect will presumably be stronger for
non-professional workers, since they must be paid overtime.15
Summarizing, from a supply side perspective, the rivalry, productivity, and selection
explanations all imply a positive relationship between hours worked and localization, at least in
some circumstances. These explanations never imply a negative relationship. The supply side
explanations predict different patterns of labor supply for different types of occupations and age
groups. From a demand side perspective, a work-spreading effect is predicted.

15

The Fair Labor Act of 1938 requires that employers pay 1-1/2 times the regular wage for hours worked beyond a
"standard" work week (Pencavel (1986)). The law was modified in 1940 to set the standard week at 40 hours for a
wide range of non-professional occupations.
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C.

Urbanization and localization revisited
This suggests that differencing strategies can shed light on the agglomeration-hours

worked relationship. We return, therefore, to the patterns in Model 2 of Table 3. In this model
the coefficients on urbanization (PopDen) for young and middle-aged non-professionals are both
nearly equal to zero, while the coefficients on localization (OccDen) are negative, significant,
and identical in magnitude. This pattern is consistent with work spreading, but offers little
evidence of selection, productivity, or rivalry.
Among professional workers, the most important patterns concern the localization
variable, OccDen. The coefficient on OccDen, although positive for both young and middleaged professionals, is much larger for the younger workers. The positive influence of OccDen
on hours worked among young and middle-aged professionals is consistent with the presence of
selection and/or productivity effects.16 The much larger influence of OccDen on young versus
middle-aged professionals is consistent with a rat race. The next section focuses more tightly on
the rat race. For that reason, from this point on we restrict our analysis to professional workers.

D.

Rivalry and inequality among professional workers
We begin by constructing an additional variable whose function is to help isolate the

potential for labor market rivalry (Rival). As a first step, we calculate the national hourly wage
distribution for all full-time workers in the individual’s age cohort and occupation grouping men
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Kahn and Lang (1991) find that about half of the workforce would prefer to work more or less, holding the hourly
wage constant. A much greater number would prefer to work more. Our results are at least broadly consistent with
this finding. There are fewer professionals than nonprofessionals, and we find behavior consistent with a rat race for
the former and not the latter. For nonprofessionals, we find "work spreading," which is consistent with wanting to
work more and not being able to.
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and women together. Next, we add up the number of full-time workers in the individual’s work
PUMA and occupation that are in the individual’s 5-percentile range in the age- and occupationspecific national wage distribution.17 As before, person sampling weights are used to ensure that
the number of rivals present is calculated from a representative sample. If rivalry effects are
present for young professionals but not for older professionals, Rival should have a positive
influence on hours worked among young professionals but not for older professionals.
Table 4 presents results from several different models that provide increasingly stringent
tests for whether rivalry contributes to longer hours worked. Beginning with the simplest
specification, Model 3 controls for the influence of PopDen, OccDen, and Rival.18 In this model,
the effect of PopDen is negative, marginally significant, and nearly identical for both age groups,
while the effect of OccDen is positive, significant, and also nearly identical for both age groups.
Controlling for rivalry, therefore, young and middle-aged professionals tend to behave in a
similar manner, at least with respect to the influence of agglomeration on work hours.
Consider next the coefficient on Rival. The estimated elasticity of hours worked with
respect to Rival equals .40 percent for young workers (with a t-ratio of 2.58) but minus .68
percent (with a t-ratio of -3.80) for middle-aged workers. The negative effect of Rival on
middle-aged professional work hours is indicative of demand-side effects: an increase in the
presence of similar workers serves to spread work loads across individuals, reducing individual
hours worked. The positive effect of Rival on young professional work hours lends further
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For example, for a 30-year old doctor at the 32nd percentile of the national wage distribution for all doctors in their
30s (including men and women), we add up the number of doctors in the individual’s work PUMA whose wages are
in the 30th through 34th percentiles of the national wage distribution. Had the doctor’s wage been at the 36th
percentile, we would have added up individuals in the 35th through 39th percentiles of the distribution.

18

As before, only the agglomeration variables are presented, but all of the variables and the occupation fixed effects
in Table 2 are included in these models.
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support to the idea that signaling and rivalry contribute to an urban rat race among young
professionals.
The theory governing rivalrous behavior allows for even more stringent tests. This is
because the rat race depends crucially on the rewards to getting ahead. Eliminate such rewards,
and the incentive to compete with rivals goes away, or at least is diminished. This idea is
consistent with the argument that an unequal wage distribution creates incentives for workers to
seek advancement and so encourages hard work (e.g. Bell and Freeman (2000)). Accordingly,
we specify a variable that captures the degree of wage inequality in professional occupations
(WageIQR). This measure equals the inter-quartile range of log-wage rates for full-time workers
(35 hours or more per week) in the individual’s occupation and age category (young versus
middle-aged) in the individual’s work PUMA.19
When WageIQR is large, there are large rewards to getting ahead in the individual’s
occupation and local labor market. In this case, we expect professionals to work longer hours.
Moreover, when WageIQR equals zero, rivalry effects should disappear, young professionals
should behave more like middle-aged professionals, and Rival should have a negative effect on
hours worked as the work load allocated to a group of potential rivals is spread over more
individuals. These latter ideas are tested by including interactions between the Rival and
WageIQR variables in the model.
Returning to Table 4, Model 4 adds the wage inequality measure (WageIQR). The
corresponding coefficients are positive and highly significant for both age groups. This is
consistent with the Bell and Freeman (2000) conclusion that wage inequality increases hours
worked. Also, the remaining agglomeration coefficients are little changed from the previous
19

The inter-quartile wage variable is calculated using the person weights in the IPUMS to ensure a representative
measure as with the OccDen and Rival variables.
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model. The pattern begins to change in Model 5 where WageIQR is replaced with the interaction
of Rival and WageIQR. Although the interactive term is positive and highly significant, absent
wage inequality (WageIQR equal to zero), the influence of Rival is substantially reduced and no
longer significant among young professionals.
Model 6 provides a complete specification of the Rival and WageIQR variables, with
direct measures of each along with the interactive term. Two striking results emerge. First, the
coefficient on Rival is now negative and highly significant for young professionals and similar in
magnitude to the corresponding coefficient among middle-aged professionals. Second, the
interactive term is positive, highly significant for both groups, but twice as large for the younger
workers. These results are consistent with priors, and they suggest that when the financial
rewards to getting ahead are zero (WageIQR equal to zero), the presence of rivals (Rival) has
nearly the same effect on the hours worked of young professionals as for middle-aged
professionals. The negative coefficient on Rival is suggestive of demand side effects in which the
work load is spread among a greater number of individuals. In contrast, as the financial rewards
to getting ahead increase (WageIQR becomes large), young professionals work longer hours
relative to middle-age professionals.
As a further robustness check, Model 7 interacts the occupation fixed effects with MSA
fixed effects. This controls for additional unobserved MSA attributes that might affect hours
worked, including MSA differences in productivity levels, the local cost of living, and the
activities carried out by a Census defined occupation. This approach also increases the number
of fixed effects from 70 in the previous models to roughly 6,100. The inclusion of so many fixed
effects controls for a vast array of unobserved effects, but also has the effect of reducing
variation in the data, making identification more difficult.
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Not surprisingly, in Model 7 the significance of the coefficients on PopDen and OccDen
is substantially reduced. This occurs because PopDen and OccDen do not vary within Work
PUMAs for a given occupation, which limits their variation within MSAs. On the other hand,
the rival and wage inequality variables do vary within Work PUMAs for each occupation.
Estimates of the coefficients on these variables and their interaction are little changed from those
in Model 6. This is an important result because it suggests that the various agglomeration
variables already included in the model largely capture the influence of metropolitan area
attributes relevant to hours worked among professionals.

D.

Wages
Do the forces that contribute to hard work in cities also enhance the hourly output and

productivity of urban workers? Examining wages enables us to address this question, while
shedding further light the forces that contribute to the agglomeration-hours worked relationship.
We are guided by the following principle: with competitive markets, factors that encourage
longer work hours without commensurate gains in output result in lower hourly wages. Thus, if
the extra work is matched by a greater than proportionate increase in output, then hourly wages
will rise.
Tables 5 and 6 replicate the specifications in Tables 3 and 4, with log of hours worked
replacing log of hourly wage. In Table 5, Model 1 shows that wages are higher in more densely
populated areas (PopDen) for both professional and non-professional workers. However, as with
the hours worked analysis, in Model 2 it is clear that localization effects – measured by the
density of employment in the worker’s occupation – are the driving force behind higher wages in
urbanized areas. Specifically, the coefficients on PopDen are negative in all cases, while the
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coefficients on OccDen are positive and highly significant for all groups. For professionals, the
OccDen wage elasticity is 5 percent for younger workers and 6.7 percent for middle-aged
workers. For non-professionals the analogous elasticities are 3.1 and 3.8 percent, respectively.
Thus, localization effects appear to be stronger for professionals relative to non-professionals,
and for middle-aged workers relative to younger workers. Assuming that older workers and
professionals are more skilled, this suggests that the productivity gains associated with
localization are larger for more highly-skilled segments of the workforce.
In Table 6, we add controls for local rivals, restricting attention to professional workers.
Adding these controls does not affect the qualitative impact of PopDen and OccDen. As
reported before, for example, the elasticity with respect to OccDen is 50 to 100 percent larger for
middle-aged professionals than for younger professionals. A very different pattern is evident
with regard to the influence of local rivals. In Model 7, for example, the direct effect of Rival is
positive, highly significant, and twice as large for young professionals as for middle-aged
professionals. In addition, the interactive term has an elasticity of minus 11.36 percent for young
professionals and is highly significant, but is small, positive, and insignificant for middle-aged
professionals.
How should these results be interpreted? The negative coefficients on PopDen could
indicate either that congestion is costly to firms or that workers enjoy amenities found in densely
populated areas, both of which would serve to reduce wages. In contrast, the positive
coefficients on OccDen suggest that cities are productive places not so much because of their
size per se, but because of the concentration of activity within individual occupations. This
finding is consistent with some prior studies of employment growth in cities (e.g. Henderson et
al (1995), Rosenthal and Strange (2003a)). This finding is also consistent with recent work on
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agglomeration and wages. Glaeser and Mare (1999), for example, report evidence that wages are
higher in large cities, consistent with our findings in Model 1 (Table 5). Wheaton and Lewis
(2001) find evidence that localization effects contribute to higher wages, consistent with our
results in Model 2 (Table 5).20 In addition, the positive coefficients on OccDen suggest that
some combination of selection and productivity effects enhance the average hourly output of
urban professionals. That is exactly what one would expect to the extent that agglomerated labor
markets make workers more valuable while also attracting talented individuals.21
These findings are in the spirit of the well-known Marshall (1890,1920) vs. Jacobs (1969)
debate on whether localization or urbanization economies are more important.22 The results on
the rival variable address an entirely different aspect of agglomeration economies. As noted
above, the interactive term Rival*WageIQR has a significantly negative and large coefficient for
young professionals, but is positive, small, and insignificant for middle-aged professionals.
Among young professionals, therefore, the extra hours worked arising from rivalrous behavior
(as documented in Table 4) is not matched by a corresponding increase in output, causing hourly
wages to fall. This result is consistent with diminishing marginal productivity of work effort, in
other words, fatigue. The result is also in the spirit of Saxenian (1994), and adds to the literature
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Neither Wheaton and Lewis (2001) nor Glaeser and Mare (1999), however, identify the marginal effects of both
the overall level of urbanization and employment concentration within individual industries, in contrast to our
specifications here. In addition, Wheaton and Lewis (2001) and Glaeser and Mare (1999) use total counts of
workers and residents when measuring agglomeration while we express our agglomeration measures in terms of the
density of development. In this regard, our agglomeration measures are closer in spirit to the measures used by
Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Rosenthal and Strange (2003a).

21

Glaeser and Mare (1999) take pains to distinguish between selection and productivity effects that contribute to
higher urban wages. After drawing on a variety of datasets and methods, they conclude that productivity effects
undoubtedly contribute to higher big city wages, although selection effects may play a role as well.

22

For instance, Glaeser et al (1992) and Henderson et al (1995).
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in which the nature of urban interactions is crucial to agglomeration economies (see also
Rosenthal and Strange (2003a)).23

F.

Magnitudes
This paper has analyzed the effects of agglomeration on hours worked and wages. A

clear pattern has emerged, the key features of which are the differences between the effects of
agglomeration on professionals versus non-professionals and young versus middle-aged workers.
This section will further characterize the economic importance of these differences.
Earlier in the paper, Model 2 of Table 3 showed that OccDen had different effects on
hours for young and middle-aged professionals. To get a sense of the magnitude of these
estimates, we calculate the impact of OccDen on hours worked for the two groups of cities in
Table 1 (New York, Chicago,Los Angeles and Hartford, Milwaukee, Sacramento). Among
young professionals, on average, localization effects (OccDen) increase hours worked in the
larger cities by 0.7 percent relative to the smaller cities. This is equivalent to roughly 16
additional work hours per year assuming a 45 hour work week for 50 weeks. Among middleaged professionals OccDen increases hours worked in the larger cities by .28 percent relative to
the smaller cities, an increase of 6.3 hours per year. As a point of comparison, consensus
estimates of the magnitude of agglomeration economies associated with a doubling of city size
are roughly 4% (Rosenthal and Strange (2003b)). Of course, the hours-worked numbers
discussed here are based on a model that does not separately identify the influence of rivalrous
behavior.
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Our findings regarding the influence of rivals contrast with Porter (1990), whose analysis stresses the
productivity benefits of competition among producers. In our case, competition among rivals appears to contribute
to signaling that is not necessarily productivity enhancing.
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In Table 7, therefore, we examine the degree to which the presence of rivals contributes
to hours worked and hourly wage rates among young and middle-aged professionals for the same
two groups of cities. This is done by applying the Rival and Rival*WageIQR coefficients from
Model 7 of Tables 4 and 6 to the individual level data and then averaging across observations.24
Several patterns stand out. First, rivals have a substantial impact on hours worked for
young professionals, as shown by the first row and first four columns of the table. The presence
of rivals increases the hours worked among younger workers by 2.3 percent in the larger cities.
This translates into just over 1 additional hour worked per week or the equivalent of about one
extra week of work per year – a very large effect. In the smaller cities, this effect is only half as
large. In addition, the presence of rivals reduces hours worked among middle-aged professionals
by 2 percent in both groups of cities. It is clear, therefore, that the presence of rivals
substantially elevates hours worked among young professionals relative to middle-aged
professionals, and this effect is most pronounced in the largest cities.
The remaining four columns of the table consider the influence of rivals on wages. Here
too the patterns are revealing. Among young professionals, the presence of rivals has a similar
influence on wage rates in both groups of cities, adding roughly 13 percent to hourly wage.
Among middle-aged professionals, the presence of rivals also has a similar influence on wage
rates in both groups of cities, but here the impact is much larger, roughly 25 percent. The large
positive impact of rivals on middle-aged wage rates is suggestive that for this group the presence
of similar workers enhances productivity. However, consistent with our earlier discussions, the
much smaller impact of rivals on the wage rates of younger professionals is suggestive of worker
fatigue, possibly the result of long hours spent signaling.

24

Sampling weights were used when averaging to ensure a representative result.
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Finally, the second row of Table 7 highlights the impact of the presence of rivals on
hours worked and wage rates for young and middle-aged lawyers, a profession famous for its
long hours and also the focus of recent work by Landers et al (1996).25 It is immediately
apparent that the influence of rivals on hours worked and wage rates for lawyers is qualitatively
the same as for all professionals. However, it is also clear that the presence of rivals has a
substantially larger impact on the hours worked of young lawyers relative to all young
professionals. Specifically, proximity to rivals elevates hours worked among young lawyers by
1.9 percent in the three moderate sized cities and by 3.8 percent in the larger cities. Lawyers, it
would seem, deserve some of their reputation for rivalrous behavior, at least among younger
individuals.

IV.

Conclusion
This paper is the first to systematically document a relationship between hours worked

and agglomeration. In doing so, we find convincing evidence that among non-professional
workers, agglomeration tends to spread out workloads over a larger number of individuals,
resulting in diminished individual hours worked. Among professional workers, the pattern is
different. Here, agglomeration increases hours worked. Using differencing methods, the paper
finds evidence of both selection and productivity effects and also of the rat race effect. The
paper is, therefore, one of very few to have provided empirical evidence in support of Akerlof’s
(1976) theory of the rat race.
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In constructing these measures we first estimated the hours worked and wage models separately for lawyers and
judges including metropolitan fixed effects as in Model 7 in Tables 4 and 6.
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The paper can also be seen as contributing to the literature on agglomeration. Over
eighty years ago Marshall (1890, 1920) argued that cities are productive places because they
allow for pooling of labor, sharing of intermediate inputs, and knowledge spillovers. This paper
adds to that list by providing evidence that industrious professionals are drawn to agglomerated
areas, and that agglomeration requires professionals to work harder. This provides an entirely
new explanation for why cities are productive and in so doing adds to our knowledge of the
nature and benefits of agglomeration and related economies of scale.
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Table 1: Average Hours Worked Among Full-Time Workers In Select Metropolitan Areasa
Occupation Category
Non-Professional
Workersb

Professional Workers
(including Lawyers &
Judges)b

Lawyers and Judges

Metropolitan Area
New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles

Young Males
43.58

Middle Aged Males
43.55

Hartford, Milwaukee,
Sacramento

43.72

44.02

New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles

48.12

46.77

Hartford, Milwaukee,
Sacramento

47.21

46.77

New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles

50.06

48.63

Hartford, Milwaukee,
Sacramento

47.71

48.75

a

All data are weighted to be representative using the perwt variable in the IPUMs. Hours worked are based on
the “usual hours worked per week”. Only individuals working 35 hours or more per week are included in the
sample.

b

Professional workers are individuals in occupations categorized as Professional-Technical in the OCC1950
variable of the IPUMS and who have a Masters degree or more. Non-Professionals include all other workers
except managers and agricultural workers and who have less than a Bachelors degree.
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Table 2: MALE WORKERS – 35 Hours or More Per Week
Usual Hours Worked Per Week in the Last Year
Professional Versus Non-Professional Workers
Dependent Variable: Log of Hours Worked
(t-ratios in parentheses; Robust standard errors with clustering on Work PUMAs)

Professional or Ph.D. Degreec
Some College or Associate Degreec

Professional Workersa
Age 30-40
Age 41-50
0.043
(17.42)

.0462
(19.73)

High School Degreec
Have Children
Married
Age
Age Squared
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Other Race
Immigrated 6-10 years agod
Immigrated 11-15 years agod
Immigrated 16-20 years agod
Immigrated > 21 yrs or Nat. US Citizend
Log commute time
Log population density of Work PUMA
Constant
No. of Occupation Fixed effects
No. Observations
Adj R2
Root MSE

Non-Professional Workersb
Age 30-40
Age 41-50

.0034
(1.62)
.0125
(5.53)
-.0036
( -0.60)
.00002
(0.28)
-.0270
( -5.86)
-.0270
(-6.87)
-.0179
(-3.81)
-.0126
( -0.87)
-.0079
(-1.39)
-.0079
(-1.42)
.0143
(1.68)
.0103
(2.29)
-.0108
(-10.16)
.0011
(1.79)
3.892
(36.83)
71
56,940
0.2045
0.1745

-.0008
(-0.38)
.0204
(8.04)
-.0038
(-0.39)
.00004
(0.35)
-.0285
(-5.94)
-.0364
(-8.48)
-.0163
(-3.07)
-.0160
(-3.07)
.0039
(0.42)
.0172
(1.68)
.0253
(2.85)
.0207
(2.85)
-.0134
(-13.03)
.00005
(0.96)
3.857
(17.39)
70
55,079
0.1537
0.1746

a

.0047
(5.87)
.0161
(17.25)
.0096
(13.14)
.0131
(17.52)
.0053
(2.75)
-.00008
(-2.91)
-.0344
(-34.44)
-.0062
(-1.37)
-.0252
(-17.85)
-.0175
(-4.83)
-.0029
(-0.99)
-.0065
(-2.07)
-.0020
(-0.58)
-.0073
(-2.76)
-.0067
(-12.83)
-.0012
(-3.68)
3.686
(111.95)
135
465,254
0.0750
0.1617

.0033
(3.62)
.0154
(15.27)
.0050
(6.24)
.0094
(10.97)
.0112
(3.03)
-.00001
(-3.03)
-.0332
(-28.35)
-.0007
(-0.14)
-.0256
(-14.75)
-.0108
(-2.84)
-.0109
(-2.69)
-.0081
(-1.95)
-.0062
(-1.62)
-.0155
(-4.44)
-.0089
(-16.68)
-.0011
(-3.30)
3.529
(42.29)
133
295,441
0.0760
0.1604

Professional workers belong to “professional and technical” occupations and have a Masters or higher degree.
Non-professional workers belong to non-professional and non-technical occupations and have less than a BA degree.
c
Omitted categories for salaried and hourly workers are Masters Degree and less than high school degree, respectively.
d
Omitted category is immigrated in the last five years.
b
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Table 3: MALE WORKERS – 35 Hours or More Per Weeka
Usual Hours Worked Per Week in the Last Year
Professional Versus Non-Professional Workers
Dependent Variable: Log of Hours Worked
(t-ratios in parentheses; Robust standard errors with clustering on Work PUMAs)
Professionalsb
Model 1
Age 30-40
Age 41-50
Log population density of Work PUMA
(PopDen)
Log employment density of worker’s
occupation in Work PUMA (OccDen)

.0011
(1.79)

.00005
(0.96)

Non-Professionalsc

Model 2
Age 30-40
Age 41-50
-.0032
(-2.52)

-.0018
(-1.28)

.0043
(3.63)

.0024
(1.96)

Model 1
Age 30-40
Age 41-50
-.0012
(-3.68)

No. of Occupation Fixed effects
71
70
71
70
135
No. Observations
56,940
55,079
56,940
55,078
465,254
Adj R2
0.2045
0.1537
0.2048
0.1538
0.0750
Root MSE
0.1745
0.1746
0.1745
0.1746
0.1617
a
All other variables listed in Table 2 are also included in the model but their coefficients are suppressed to conserve space.
b
Professional workers belong to “professional and technical” occupations and have a Masters or higher degree.
c

-.0011
(-3.30)

133
295,441
0.0760
0.1604

Non-professional workers belong to non-professional and non-technical occupations and have less than a Bachelors degree.
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Model 2
Age 30-40
Age 41-50
.0004
(0.46)

.0005
(0.54)

-.0016
(-2.06)

-.0016
(-2.08)

135
465,254
0.0750
0.1617

133
295,440
0.0761
0.1604

Table 4: PROFESSIONAL MALE WORKERS – 35 Hours or More Per Weeka,b
Usual Hours Worked Per Week in the Last Year
Alternative Specifications of Occupation Density Effects
Dependent Variable: Log of Hours Worked
(t-ratios in parentheses; Robust standard errors with clustering on Work PUMAs)
Age 30-40
Model 5 Model 6

Model 3

Model 4

Log population density of Work PUMA (PopDen)

-.0024
(-1.66)

-.0020
(-1.54)

-.0021
(-1.43)

Log employment density of worker’s occupation in
Work PUMA (OccDen)

.0032
(2.30)

.0027
(1.87)

Log number of workers in the individual’s age group,
occupation, and Work PUMA within 5 percentage
points in the occupation-age national wage
distribution (Rival)c

.0040
(2.58)

Interquartile range of log wages in worker’s
occupation in the worker’s Work PUMA (WageIQR)
Interactive Term: Rival x WageIQR

Age 41-50
Model 5 Model 6

Model 7

Model 3

Model 4

Model 7

-.0024
(-1.76)

-.0018
(-1.06)

-.0024
(-1.60)

-.0021
(-1.42)

-.0020
(-1.35)

-.0019
(-1.30)

-.0017
(-0.93)

.0025
(1.80)

.0029
(2.09)

.0014
(0.82)

.0036
(2.54)

.0031
(2.21)

.0029
(2.11)

.0028
(2.05)

.0024
(1.41)

.0040
(2.56)

.0009
(0.57)

-.0081
(-4.06)

-.0126
(-5.44)

-.0068
(-3.80)

-.0068
(-3.81)

-.0082
(-4.63)

-.0124
(-4.66)

-.0101
(-3.92)

-

.0124
(5.44)

-

-.0507
(-5.80)

-.0726
(-6.59)

-

.0076
(3.68)

-

-.0270
(-2.48)

-.0181
(-1.51)

-

-

.00073
(7.15)

.0205
(7.48)

.0270
(7.66)

-

-

.0030
(4.32)

.0114
(3.22)

.0078
(2.05)

No. of Occupation Fixed effects
71
71
71
71
70
70
70
70
No. of Occupation and MSA Fixed Effects
6443
6,102
No. Observations
51,302
51,302
51,302
51,302
51,302
49,673
49,673
49,673
49,673
49,673
Adj R2
0.2093
0.2100
0.2105
0.2113
0.2100
0.1555
0.1558
0.1560
0.1561
0.1607
Root MSE
.1724
.1723
.1723
.1722
.1723
.1721
.1721
.1721
.1721
.1716
a
All other variables listed in Table 2 are also included in the model but their coefficients are suppressed to conserve space.
b
Professional workers belong to “professional and technical” occupations and have a Masters or higher degree.
c
Rival is calculated by counting the number of workers in the individual’s Work PUMA in the same occupation and age category (young versus middle-aged) within 5
percentage points in the national wage distribution pertinent to the individual. For these purposes, national wage distribution is measured using all (male and female) full-time
workers (35 hours or more per week) for the same occupation and age category (young versus middle-aged) as the individual.
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Table 5: MALE WORKERS – 35 Hours or More Per Weeka
Professional Versus Non-Professional Workers
Dependent Variable: Log of Wages
(t-ratios in parentheses; Robust standard errors with clustering on Work PUMAs)
Professionalsb
Log population density of Work PUMA
(PopDen)
Log employment density of worker’s
occupation in Work PUMA (OccDen)

Model 1
Age 30-40
Age 41-50
.0113
.0180
(4.01)
(5.41)

Non-Professionalsc

Model 2
Age 30-40
Age 41-50
-.0374
-.0461
(-3.99)
(-7.48)
.0499
(5.61)

Model 1
Age 30-40
Age 41-50
.0220
.0209
(8.89)
(7.57)

.0669
(11.31)

No. of Occupation Fixed effects
71
70
71
70
134
No. Observations
51302
49674
51302
49673
440148
Adj R2
0.1895
0.2210
0.1930
0.2265
0.1615
Root MSE
.60692
.59709
.60562
.59499
.52264
a
All other variables listed in Table 2 are also included in the model but their coefficients are suppressed to conserve space.
b
Professional workers belong to “professional and technical” occupations and have a Masters or higher degree.
c

133
276350
0.1654
.53815

Non-professional workers belong to non-professional and non-technical occupations and have less than a Bachelors degree.
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Model 2
Age 30-40
Age 41-50
-.0081
-.0166
(-1.24)
(-2.25)
.0307
(5.58)

.0382
(6.14)

134
440148
0.1625
.52233

133
276349
0.1669
.53766

Table 6: PROFESSIONAL MALE WORKERS – 35 Hours or More Per Weeka,b
Alternative Specifications of Occupation Density Effects
Dependent Variable: Log of Wages
(t-ratios in parentheses; Robust standard errors with clustering on Work PUMAs)
Age 30-40
Model 5 Model 6

Model 3

Model 4

Log population density of Work PUMA (PopDen)

-.0194
(-3.04)

-.0239
(-3.55)

-.0234
( -3.36)

Log employment density of worker’s occupation in
Work PUMA (OccDen)

.0252
(4.44)

.0323
(5.28)

Log number of workers in the individual’s age group,
occupation, and Work PUMA within 5 percentage
points in the occupation-age national wage
distribution (Rival)c

.0607
(5.07)

Interquartile range of log wages in worker’s
occupation in the worker’s Work PUMA (WageIQR)
Interactive Term: Rival x WageIQR

Age 41-50
Model 5 Model 6

Model 7

Model 3

Model 4

-.0222
(-3.09)

-.0296
(-4.52)

-.0311
(-5.08)

-.0355
(-5.31)

-.0355
(-5.24)

-.0346
(-5.20)

Model 7
-.0549
(-6.96)

.0323
(5.19)

.0313
(4.92)

.0299
(4.57)

.0424
(7.07)

.0490
(7.48)

.0490
(7.37)

.0478
(7.23)

.0543
(7.00)

.0610
(5.02)

.0905
(7.34)

.1172
(9.66)

.1036
(7.26)

.0846
(9.73)

.0844
(9.71)

.0996
(11.78)

.0610
(5.33)

.0491
(4.09)

-

-.1433
(-10.00)

-

.1503
(2.30)

.1795
(2.53)

-

-.1064
(-7.28)

-

-.2507
(-3.60)

-.2062
(-2.39)

-

-

-.0499
(-10.59)

-.0951
(-4.51)

-.1136
(-4.94)

-

-

-.0308
(-6.15)

.0476
(2.06)

.0232
(0.83)

No. of Occupation Fixed effects
71
71
71
71
70
70
70
70
No. of Occupation and MSA Fixed Effects
6443
6102
No. Observations
51302
51302
51302
51302
51302
49673
49673
49673
49673
49673
Adj R2
0.1976
0.2050
0.2068
0.2074
0.2255
0.2356
0.2397
0.2389
0.2401
0.2651
Root MSE
.60389
.6011
.60041
.60019
.59329
.59148
.58987
.59017
.58972
.57992
a
All other variables listed in Table 2 are also included in the model but their coefficients are suppressed to conserve space.
b
Professional workers belong to “professional and technical” occupations and have a Masters or higher degree.
c
Rival is calculated by counting the number of workers in the individual’s Work PUMA in the same occupation and age category (young versus middle-aged) within 5
percentage points in the national wage distribution pertinent to the individual. For these purposes, national wage distribution is measured using all (male and female) full-time
workers (35 hours or more per week) for the same occupation and age category (young versus middle-aged) as the individual.

34

Table 7: The Influence of Rivals on Hours Worked and Wages in Large and Moderate Sized Citiesa

All Professionalsb
Lawyers and Judges

Percentage Impact on Hours Worked
Young Males
Middle Aged Males
New York,
Hartford,
New York,
Hartford,
Chicago,
Milwaukee,
Chicago,
Milwaukee,
Los Angeles
Sacramento
Los Angeles
Sacramento
2.30
1.10
-2.08
-2.09
3.79

1.92

-1.34

-1.70

Percentage Impact on Wages
Young Males
Middle Aged Males
New York,
Hartford,
New York,
Hartford,
Chicago,
Milwaukee,
Chicago,
Milwaukee,
Los Angeles
Sacramento
Los Angeles
Sacramento
13.0
13.7
26.9
22.0
13.4

13.5

34.3

23.5

a

Estimates were obtained by forming θ1Rival + θ2Rival*WageIQR for each individual observation in the sample and then averaging across individuals
while applying the sampling weights (“perwt”) in the IPUMs to ensure a representative result. Estimates of θ1 and θ2 for the “All Professionals” results
were obtained from Model 7 in Tables 4 and 6. For the “Lawyers and Judges” results, Model 7 was estimated using only lawyers in the sample and
estimates from those regressions (for hours and wages) used to compute the influence of rivals.
b

Professional workers are in occupations categorized as Professional-Technical in the OCC1950 variable of the IPUMS and who have a Masters degree
or more. Non-Professionals include all other workers except managers and agricultural workers and who have less than a Bachelors degree. Lawyers
and Judges belong occupation category (OCC1950) 55 and have a Masters degree or more.
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